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In this book, the contributors set out to trace the development of techniques of opinion management from the First World War
to the current conflict in Afghanistan. Michael Warren finds that this book makes valuable contributions to a rich body of
literature critiquing how leaders, media and other entities shape public opinion, whilst being accessible and thought-
provoking to readers new to the subject.
Propaganda, Power and Persuasion: From World War I to Wikileaks . David
Welch. I.B.Tauris. October 2013.
Find this book:
“Whom should I trust?” is the question on the mind of the reader who has just completed Propaganda, Power and
Persuasion: From World War One to Wikileaks. Media, governments and military forces are all scrutinised in this diverse
collection of fourteen articles edited by David Welch. Welch was co-curator of the recent Propaganda: Power and
Persuasion exhibit at the British Library and has assembled experts from an array of fields (ranging from History to
Communication Studies) to create Propaganda, Power and Persuasion: From World War One to Wikileaks . The
chronological and geographical scope of the collection is large: covering in detail well-known topics like Nazi propaganda to
more niche subjects such as Radio Free Asia and the final ten years of the USA Information Agency’s existence.  Such vastly
different chapters are bound together by a common thread of studying the link between war and propaganda.
The collection begins with Mark Connelly’s piece on the British Navy’s 1914 victory over the German Navy in the Battle of
Falklands Islands in ‘Propaganda, Memory and Identity: The Battle of the Falkland Islands, December 1914’. Connelly
illustrates how the battle was recast to suit the propaganda needs of different eras.  During the First World War, the battle
was viewed as a morale-boosting victory and affirmation of British naval superiority; amid the thaw of the 1920’s Anglo-
German relations a respectful projection of German combatants at the battle was shown but by the 1930’s (during the rise of
Nazism) the clash was viewed as British forces making a stand against great tyranny.
Connelly astutely notes the battle became an enduring icon of British Imperial success:  the furthest reaches of the Empire
had not only been protected by the motherland, but had been subjected to the same turmoil and the battle was used as
moment to bind imperial relations. The encounter served a ‘propagandist narrative of increasing Falklander identity and self-
worth’ which was perpetuated in stamps, postcards films and other media. The battle’s importance became profound again
in the 1970’s when it seemed possible sovereignty of the islands might be transferred to Argentina: in response, images of
the 1914 battle were invoked, and the islanders’ loyalty was recounted. Once again the battle’s symbolism had been altered,
and it became representative of proud colonial subjects fighting for their way of life.
Connelly picks up on a critical theme shared by many of the other articles in the collection: propaganda by itself is not simply
a persuasive tool, it must build upon a pre-existing opinion. Welch recalls in the book’s introduction Aldous Huxley’s pithy
analysis: “The propagandist is a man who canalises an already existing stream”. Thus, the propagandist must entrench
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existing perceptions to his or her benefit, as displayed below in the First World War recruitment poster playing on a
combination of British fears of the German advance and British men’s roles as masculine protectors of their women and
children.
Following the book from beginning to end, the reader learns of propaganda’s evolution from the simplistic rallying calls of
wartime posters to the more nuanced methods of opinion management in a digital era. For example, Gary D. Rawnsley’s
piece on Radio Free Asia (RFA) explores the method of not simply spoon feeding an audience a persuasive message but
actively involving its audience in the production of the propagandist’s message: Chinese callers are encouraged to phone
the Government funded RFA radio station with first-hand insights into a news story and thus create participatory rather than
passive message to its audience.
The increasing complexity of propaganda output is evident in Stephen Badsey’s eye-opening article on American attempts
to win Fallujah from insurgents in the Second Gulf War. Badsey observes how the line between information operations
(using information to successfully execute military operations) and public affairs (information given to the media and public)
is blurred, or ‘Bridging the Firewall’ as the chapter is named. The crossover is so great, that the media are even treated as
combatants. Initial American failure to win the city of Fallujah in 2004 was blamed on poor representation in the media
(especially Al Jazeera) as US forces believed they were being unfairly portrayed as committing atrocities. Horrifying reports
were beamed across the world by international media – sometimes as graphic as images of dead babies ‘bespattered with
blood’ and their mothers in Fallujah General Hospital. Badsey contextualises US military thinking well, describing the long-
running suspicion of media engrained in the American military – only 8% of US officers who had fought in the Vietnam War
thought the media had been ‘generally responsible’ in a 1976 survey. Thus, Badsey shows how American commanders
begrudgingly learnt the lessons of handling the global media in Iraq. The lessons came to fruition later in the year when
American forces implemented new rules of how to engage in combat (for example, US troops were ordered to record with
mobiles devices evidence of mosques and schools were being used by insurgents and better utilisation of journalists
embedded into US ranks), which led to the eventual capture of Fallujah.
The collection is enjoyable, fascinating and broad but perhaps let down by the glaring omission of articles primarily focused
on the Cold War. Although the subject is considered in the “Cold War and Post-Cold War” section, none of the three pieces in
the section place the Cold War as a sole focus of their studies. This is a shame as the Cold War was a global conflict
between two opposing ideological and economic entities it is surely a fertile area for the study of propaganda, power and
persuasion. The collection could also do with a more thorough examination of the cult of personality and less of a Western
focus. That said, the collection’s authors make concise but valuable contributions to a rich body of literature (Noam Chomsky
and Edward Herman’s Manufacturing of Consent, Philip Taylor’s Munitions of the Mind  and John Mearsheimer’s Why
Leaders Lie to name a few) critiquing how leaders, media and other entities shape public opinion, whilst being accessible
and thought-provoking to readers who might have little knowledge of the subjects discussed within the book.
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